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Abstract
The purpose of this Article is to provide some clarification of universal jurisdiction in absen-
tia. It begins with a brief overview of the state of international law on the issue, centering on the
decision of the minority judges who treated it in the Arrest Warrant decision, and discuss the ap-
plicable principles of international law, international treaties, and custom. It then briefly examines
whether allowing States to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia is consistent with the histor-
ical and philosophical justifications for the existence of universal jurisdiction generally. The final
section of the Article discusses the policy implications of such an exercise.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, international jurists have given the issue of
universal jurisdiction a great deal of attention. While some form
of universal jurisdiction exists for war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity, the exact parameters of the doctrine
are ill-defined. This Article addresses the question of whether
international law requires, or should require, the presence of
the offender in a forum State for universal jurisdiction to be ex-
ercised.
Recently, three notable situations have given rise to a discus-
sion of universal jurisdiction in absentia: the International Court
of Justice's ("ICJ") decision in Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant
of 11 April 2000 which discusses Belgium's arrest warrant for
Congolese Foreign Minister Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi; 1 the
Belgian Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases regarding
criminal proceedings private individuals brought against Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon; 2 and, finally, the recently promul-
gated Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction.' Unfortunately,
none of these instances shed much light upon the issue of
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(Oxon.). I would like to thank Profs. Rene Provost, David Lametti, and George
Fletcher, as well as Gibran Van Ert, for their helpful advice, comments and insights in
the preparation of this Paper. Any errors are, of course, my own.
1. See generally Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.),
[2002] I.C.J. 3, [2002] 41 I.L.M. 536, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/cijwww/
cdocket/cCOBE/cCOBEframe.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
2. See H.S.A. v. S.A., CA June 26, 2002, at http://ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/fichiers/
CMA-sharon-260602.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2004); CC Feb. 12, 2003 Bull. crim. No.
P.02.1139.F, available at http://www.universaljurisdiction.info/index/101391 (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2004); see also Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crime Statute: A Postmortem,
97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 888, 890 (2003).
3. See THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo
ed., 2001), at http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2004) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES). An assembly of scholars and jurists from
around the world drafted the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction for the purpose
of aiding legislators, judges, and government officials in interpreting and applying in-
ternational law. They believe that implementing these principles will promote justice
and reinforce the rule of law. See UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 19-21 (Stephen Macedo
ed., 2003).
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whether universal jurisdiction in absentia should be applied. A
majority of the ICJ declined to pronounce on the jurisdictional
issue,4 the Belgian Courts relied almost exclusively upon domes-
tic law arguments in interpreting its expansive, since-repealed
legislation,5 and the authors of the Princeton Principles deliber-
ately avoided the question altogether.'
The purpose of this Article is to provide some clarification
of universal jurisdiction in absentia. I will begin with a brief over-
view of the state of international law on the issue, centering on
the decision of the minority judges who treated it in the Arrest
4. See Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 18, [2002] 41 I.L.M at 547-48.
5. The original Belgian legislation providing for broad universal jurisdiction was
Loi du 16juin 1993 relative d la rdpression des infractions graves aux Conventions internation-
ales de Geneve du 12 aorit 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977 additionels d ces
conventions [Law of June 16, 1993 relative to the repression of grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention of August 1949 and of additional Protocols I and II ofJune 8 1977],
MONITEUR BELGE 17751 (Aug. 5, 1993), available at http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/
1993.html (modifying the 1993 law). See H.S.A. v. S.A., CC Feb. 12, 2003 Bull. crim. No.
P.02.1139.F, available at http://www.universaljurisdiction.info/index/101391 (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2004) (providing the Belgian Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court) decision
concerning the case against Ariel Sharon). In 2003, Belgium modified the legislation,
narrowing its reach. See loi du 23 Avril 2003 - loi modifiant la loi du 16juin 1993 relative d la
r6pression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire et l'article 144ter du Code
judiciaire [Law of April 23, 2003 - modifying Law ofJune 16, 1993 Concerning the Pun-
ishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law and Article 144 of the
Judicial Code] (1), art. 5 (2003) (Belg.) (modifying the 1993 law) [hereinafter Law of
June 16, 1993]; see also Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone By Its Global Reach;
Case Against Political Figures Sparked Crisis, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2003, at Al.
6. See generally PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 3. Stephen W. Becker, who served
as rapporteur to the Drafting Committee and research assistant to Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni (one of the scholars who voted on the proposed principles), writes,
[s]hould the Principles insist at least that the accused is physically present in
the territory of the enforcing [S]tate? Should other connecting links also be
required? Participants decided not to include an explicit requirement of a
territorial link in Principle 1 (1)'s definition. This was done partly to allow for
further discussion, partly to avoid stifling the evolution of universal jurisdic-
tion, and partly out of deference to pending litigation in the International
Court of Justice.
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 43. Principle 1(2) of the Princeton project pro-
vides that universal jurisdiction may be exercised by a competent and ordinary judicial
body of any State in order to try a person duly accused of committing serious crimes
under international law as specified in Principle (2)1, provided the person is present before
such judicial body. See id. However, as Becker points out, "[t]he language of Principle
1(2) does not prevent a [Sitate from initiating the criminal process, conducting an
investigation, issuing an indictment, or requesting extradition, when the accused is not
present." Id. at 44.
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Warrant decision,7 and discuss the applicable principles of inter-
national law, international treaties, and custom. I will then
briefly examine whether allowing States to exercise universal ju-
risdiction in absentia is consistent with the historical and philo-
sophical justifications for the existence of universal jurisdiction
generally. The final section of the Article will discuss the policy
implications of such an exercise.
I. THE ICJ RULING: THE ARREST WARRANT CASE
On April 11, 2000, an investigating judge of the Brussels tri-
bunal de premiere instance issued an international arrest warrant in
absentia against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, at that time Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
("D.R.C").' Ndombasi was charged with "grave breaches" of the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,0 and crimes against
humanity pursuant to the Belgian Loi du 16juin 1993 relative d la
repression des infractions graves aux conventions internationales de
Geneve du 12 aofit 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8juin 1977, addi-
tionnels d ces conventions [Law of 16 June 1993 Concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
August 12 1949 and of Additional Protocols I and II of June 8,
1977].11 The Court alleged that Ndombasi made speeches incit-
ing racial hatred against Tutsi refugees in the D.R.C., referring
to them as "vermin" and calling for their extermination.1 2
On October 17, 2000, the D.R.C. instituted proceedings
before the ICJ contesting the validity of the international war-
rant." Initially, the D.R.C. impugned the validity of the warrant
on two grounds. First, it argued, the warrant violated the rule of
customary international law that a sitting Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs enjoys absolute immunity from prosecution before foreign
7. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 64, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 579 (joint separate
opinion of Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J. & Buergenthal, J.).
8. See World Court Won't Axe Warrant for Congo Minister, CNN.coM, Dec. 8, 2000, at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/12/08/congo.belgium.reut/.
9. See Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 3, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 538.
10. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
11. Law of June 16, 1993, supra note 5.
12. See World Court Won't Axe Warrant for Congo Minister, supra note 8, at 5.
13. See Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.CJ. at 121, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 543 (noting that the
D.R.C.'s final submission drops the jurisdiction argument).
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municipal tribunals. 4 Second, the D.R.C. contended Belgium
lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant, since universal jurisdic-
tion could only be exercised if the accused is present in the fo-
rum State at the time the warrant is issued.15 This second argu-
ment was subsequently dropped from the Congo's final submis-
sions.
16
The majority of the Court held that the non ultra petita rule,
by which a court does not address arguments not raised by the
parties themselves, prevented the Court from ruling on the juris-
dictional issue. 7 It went on to consider the issue of immunity,
and concluded that as a matter of customary international law,
Ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy absolute immunity from prose-
cution in foreign municipal courts while they hold office, and
that no exception to this premise existed for war crimes or
crimes against humanity. 8
Judges Van den Wyngaert,19  Higgins, Kooijmans, Bu-
ergenthal,2 ° and Guillaume2" disagreed with the majority on the
application of the non ultra petita rule, holding that the issue of
jurisdiction should have been addressed, since it was not possible
to conceive of absolute "immunity from the jurisdiction of mu-
nicipal courts," without determining whether such jurisdiction
existed in the first place. In addition, although Judges Bula-
Bula,22 Rezek,2" and Ranjeva2 4 agreed that the non ultra petita
rule prevented the Court from ruling on the question ofjurisdic-




16. See id. See generally Memorial of the Democratic Republic of Congo, [2001]
I.C.J. Pleadings, at http://www.icj-cij.org/cijwww/cdocket/cCOBE/cCOBEframe.htm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
17. See Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.CJ. at 18, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 547-48.
18. See id., [2002] I.C.J. at 24, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 551.
19. See id., [2002] I.C.J. at 24, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 633 (dissenting opinion of Van
den Wyngaert, J.).
20. See id., [2002] I.CJ. at 64, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 576 (joint separate opinion of
Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J. & Buergenthal, J.).
21. See id., [2002] l.C.J. at 35, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 558 (separate opinion of Presi-
dent Guillaume).
22. See id., [2002] I.C.J. at 112-13, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 604-06 (separate opinion of
Bula Bula, J.).
23. See id., [2002] I.C.J. at 91-94, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 592-94.
24. See id., [2002] I.CJ. at 55-59, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 569-73 (declaration of
Ranjeva, J.).
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Judge Van den Wyngaert argued that universal jurisdiction
in absentia was permissible in international law under the deci-
sion of the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") 2 5
in the Case of the S.S. "Lotus".2 6 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal agreed with Judge Van den Wyngaert, provided
that: (1) all applicable immunities are respected; (2) the na-
tional State of the accused person is first given the opportunity
to act upon the charges alleged; (3) the charges are laid by a
prosecutor or juge d'instruction who acts in full independence,
without links to or control by the government of the State; and
(4) it is reserved for only the most heinous international
crimes. 2 1 Judges Guillaume, 2' Ranjeva, 29 Rezek,3 ° and Bula-
Bula, 1 on the other hand, stated that as a matter of customary
international law, the exercise of universal jurisdiction requires
the presence of the accused.
II. WHO GOT IT RIGHT?
International law traditionally recognizes five types of juris-
diction. 2 Territorial jurisdiction exists for the prosecution of
crimes committed on State territory ("subjective territorial juris-
diction"), or the effects of which are felt on State territory ("ob-
jective territorial jurisdiction"). Personal jurisdiction exists for
crimes committed by ("active personal jurisdiction") or against
("passive personal jurisdiction") a national of the forum State.3 4
According to the protection principle, States also have jurisdic-
25. Predecessor to the International Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the
United Nations.
26. SeeArrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 169-75, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 635-36 (dissenting
opinion of Van den Wyngaert, J.); see also The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.),
[1927] P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/
decisions/1927.09.07 lotus/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
27. See Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 80-81, [20021 41 I.L.M. at 586 (joint separate
opinion of Higgins, J. Kooijmans, J. & Buergenthal, J.).
28. See id., [2002] I.C.J. at 43, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 586 (separate opinion of Presi-
dent Guillaume).
29. See id., [2002] I.C.J. at 55, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 571 (declaration of Ranjeva, J.).
30. See id., [2002] I.C.J. at 92, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 593 (separate opinion of Rezek,
J.).
31. See id., [2002] I.C.J. at 125, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 611-12 (separate opinion of
Bula-Bula, J.).
32. See Maj. Richard Pregent, Presidential Authority to Displace Customary International
Law, 129 MIL. L. REv. 77, 89 (1990) (describing the four types ofjurisdiction).
33. See id.
34. See id.
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tion where an act or offense threatens her security. 35 In each of
these instances, there is some connection between the prosecut-
ing State and the accused or the act at issue. Universal jurisdic-
tion, by contrast, is exercisable for a small number of crimes
against international law, such as piracy, slavery, war crimes,
drug trafficking, and genocide. 36 Although these crimes do not
affect the forum State in particular, they are of such a serious
nature that perpetrators may be characterized as enemies of
mankind in general, or hostis humani generis, and as such, any
State has jurisdiction to try them.37
The principles of international law regarding normative ju-
risdiction were set out by the PCIJ in the Lotus Case:
It does not, however follow that international law prohibits a
State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in re-
spect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place
abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule
of international law.... Far from laying down a general pro-
hibition to the effect that States may not extend the applica-
tion of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to per-
sons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them
in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only lim-
ited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other
cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it
regards as best and most suitable.38
The general principle in international law is, therefore, that
States are free to extend the application of their laws as far as
they desire, unless a rule of international law can be found
which prohibits the exercise of such jurisdiction.
That said, in recent years, the presumption of jurisdiction
set out in the Lotus decision has been challenged by members of
the ICJ. In the Case Concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, for example, Judges Shahabuddeen' 9 and
35. SeeJ. MAUUICE ARBOUR, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 265 (1997).
36. See id. at 276.
37. See AMNESTY INT'L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DuTY TO ENACT AND ENFORCE
LEGISLATION (2001), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGIOR530042001
(last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
38. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), [1927] P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4,
18.
39. See Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
[1996] I.C.J. 226, 337 (dissenting opinion of Shahabuddeen, J.).
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Bedjaoui4 ° expressed doubts as to the doctrine's continued ap-
plicability in the contemporary context of globalization, interna-
tional cooperation, and an increasingly limited conception of
State sovereignty. In addition, as Judge Guillaume pointed out
in his individual opinion, the PCIJ in the Lotus case expressed
some doubt as to whether the presumption of jurisdiction ap-
plied in the criminal context, and concluded that it was unneces-
sary to decide this point.41 Accordingly, it is possible that before
asserting universal jurisdiction in absentia, States may be required
to point to the existence of a positive rule of law that permits
this.
Presently, there is no treaty that recognizes the right of
States to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia. Most of the
treaties that currently provide for universal jurisdiction expressly
state that the accused should be found on the territory of the
prosecuting State. For example, Article 36(2) of the Single Con-
vention on Narcotics and Drugs, of 1961 provides that:
[s]erious offences heretofore referred to committed either by
nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party in
whose territory the offence was committed, or by the Party in
whose territory the offender is found if extradition is not accept-
able in conformity with the law of the Party to which applica-
tion is made ....42
The main exceptions are the Geneva Conventions, none of
which explicitly require the accused to be present in the prose-
cuting State. Rather, each states that "[e] ach High Contracting
Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged
to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed .. .
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their
nationality, before its own courts."4 The use of the words
40. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nucear Weapons, [ 1996] I.C.J. at 270 (Declara-
tion of President Bedjaoui).
41. See Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), [2002]
I.C.J. 3, 43, [2002] 41 I.L.M. 536, 559 (separate opinion of President Guillaume).
42. See Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 72, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 581 (joint separate
opinion of Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J. & Buergenthal, J.) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted); see also Luc REYDAMs, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICI
PAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 44 (2003) [hereinafter REYDAMs, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION]
(pointing out that requiring the presence of the accused in the forum State in interna-
tional treaties that provided for the exercise of universal jurisdiction can be traced to
the early 20th century).
43. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
2005] UN!VERSAL JURISDICTION IN ABSENTIA 507
"search for," however, implies that parties to the Convention
have an obligation to prosecute the perpetrators "found" as a
result of investigations in their territory.44
Customary international law is unclear on the subject of uni-
versal jurisdiction in absentia.45 The dearth and inconsistency of
State practice on the issue prevent any definitive conclusions
from being reached at this time. A majority of the States that
have implemented the various conventions establishing universal
jurisdiction in their national legislation expressly require the
presence of the offender on their territory before asserting juris-
diction.4 6 For example, Article 689-1 of the French Penal Code
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
129(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Two more exceptions are the Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 28, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S.
215, which provides that "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the
framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and
impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever nationality, who
commit or order to be committed a breach of the present Convention," and the Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, art. 105, Dec. 10, 1982, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, which provides
that "[o]n the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and
under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board
44. See Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 71, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 581 (joint separate
opinion of Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J. & Buergenthal, J.); see also RExvAmS, UNIVERSAL
JUISDICTION, supra note 42, at 55. Reydams points out that the second sentence of the
provisions in question reads, "[i]t may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Con-
tracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima
facie case." Id. This text seems, at least at first blush, to imply that a third State (i.e., a
State other than the one in which an accused is found) may initiate proceedings against
him or her. As Reydams points out however, this argument is undermined by the fact
that the words "Other High Contracting Party" are qualified by the adjective "con-
cerned," implying that there must be a special link, be it personal or territorial, between
them and the grave breach which is in issue. See id.
45. Customary law and conventional law are the primary sources that make up
international law. See THE LEGAL INFORMATION INsTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
OVERVIEW, (2004), at http://www.law.comell.edu/topics/international.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2004). "Customary international law results when [S] tates follow certain prac-
tice generally and consistently out of a sense of legal obligation . . . [as opposed to]
Conventional law, [which] derives from international agreements and may take any
form that the contracting parties agree upon." Id.
46. See REVDAMs, UNVERSALJURISDICION, supra note 42, at 221.
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provides, "[p]ursuant to the international conventions referred
to below, any person who renders himself guilty outside the terri-
tory of the Republic of any of the offences enumerated in those
article may, if in France, be prosecuted and tried by French
courts . . ."' Similarly, Section Eight of the Canadian Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act states that "[a] person
who is alleged to have committed an offence under [S]ection
[Six] or [Seven] may be prosecuted for that offense if ... after
the time the offense is alleged to have been committed, the person
is present in Canada.'' 4' The Australian War Crimes Act of 1945,
as amended in 1988, is even more restrictive, and requires that
the accused be an Australian resident or citizen at the time of
committing the offense. 49
There is also domestic case law declaring that an accused
must be within a forum State before it may exercise universal
jurisdiction. In Germany, for example, courts have held that in
order for the federation to exercise universal normative jurisdic-
tion there must be some "link" between the accused and the
State, such as the presence of the accused in the country. In
Public Prosecutor v. Jorgic,5 0 a German Court convicted a Bosnian
Serb living in Germany of war crimes, holding that Germany
could exercise universal jurisdiction, as the accused had been
47. Code de procedure p~nale [Criminal Procedure Code], art. 689-1 (1992) (Fr.)
(emphasis added). Article 689-1 states:
En application des conventions internationales visles aux articles suivants pent etre
poursuivie et jugife par les juridictions franfaises, si eUe se trouve en France, toute per-
sonne qui s'est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la Rdpublique de l'une des infrac-
tions gnum&gres par ces articles. Les dispositions du prdsent article sont applicables d la
tentative de ces infractions, chaque fois que celle-ci est punissable.
[Applying the international conventions alluded to in the following articles,
can be prosecuted and sentenced by the French courts, if located in France,
any person that would be guilty of a breach outside of the territory of the
Republic of one of the breach listed in these articles. The provisions of this
article are applicable for the attempt to breach, each time that one is punisha-
ble.]
Id.
48. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, R.S.C., ch. 24 (2000) (Can.)
(emphasis added).
49. See War Crimes Act, No. 48 (1945), amended by the War Crimes Amendment
Act, No. 3 (1989) (Austl.); see also Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Congo v. Belg.), [2002] I.C.J. 3, 69, [2002] 41 I.L.M. 536, 79 (joint separate opinion of
Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J. & Buergenthal, J.) (noting statute provides for the prosecu-
tion of Australian citizens for war crimes committed between 1939 and 1945).
50. See REYDams, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 42, at 152-56 (citation omit-
ted) (discussing Public Prosecutor v. Jorgic, BayObLG Duisseldorf, Sept. 26, 1997)).
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voluntary residing in Germany at the time of his arrest.51
In 1998, the Federal Supreme Court further ruled that two
nationals of the former Yugoslavia could not be prosecuted in
Germany for genocide or grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions allegedly committed in the Balkans against non-German
nationals unless they were present in Germany.52 The Court
held that there was no "meaningful point of contact" with Ger-
many to ground an exercise of jurisdiction, adding "[i] t is quite
another thing when the offender is present in Germany; in that
case there is an internationally undisputed linking point for the
exercise of jurisdiction. " "
The French and Dutch courts have adopted a similar posi-
tion.5 4 In In re Javor,55 certain Bosnian nationals filed a com-
plaint concerning the torture inflicted upon them in a Serbian
detention camp.56 Specific perpetrators were not named.5" The
Cour de Cassation upheld the decision of the Cour d'Appel, hold-
ing that authorities could not initiate prosecutions unless the ac-
cused was present in French territory.58 In In re Bouterse,5 9 the
Dutch Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion, holding that
the Netherlands could not prosecute the former leader of Suri-
name for war crimes, since he was not present in the Nether-
lands at any stage in the proceedings.6 ° The Danish Director of
prosecution declined to indict Augusto Pinochet for the same
51. See id.
52. See id at 151-52 (discussing case of X v. S & DB, BGH, Dec. 11, 1998). The
Federal Supreme Court cast doubt upon this position in the subsequent case of Public
Prosecutor v. Sokolovic, BGH, Feb. 21, 2001. See id. at 155-56.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., In re Javor, Cass. Crim., Mar. 26, 1996, 95-81527, available at http://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=CASS&nod=CXRXAX1996X03X
06X00132X000 (last visited Nov.14, 2004).
55. CA Paris, Nov. 24, 1994, Bull. Crim. 1996, No. 132, 279, at http://www.legi
france.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=CASS&nod=CXRXAX1996X03X06X013
2X000 (last visited Nov. 14, 2004); see also Brigitte Stern & Bernard Oxman, International
Decision: In reJavor, 93 Am. J. INT'L. L. 525 (1999).
56. SeeJavor, CA Paris, Nov. 24, 1994, Bull. Crim. 1996, No. 132, 279.
57. See id.
58. SeeJavor, Cass. Crim., Mar. 26, 1996, 95-81527.
59. Hof, Amsterdam, Nov. 20, 2000, Nos. R 97/163/12 Sv and R 97/176/12 Sv,
5.4, available at http://www.universaljurisdiction.info/index/Cases/Cases/Netherlands
-__Boutersecase/CaseDoc_Summaries/143713,0 (summarizing Bouterse case); see also
REYAvms, UNIVERSALJURISDICTION, supra note 42, at 173 n.51 (discussing Bouterse case).
60. See REaAA s, UNIVERSAL JuRISDICTOON, supra note 42, at 178.
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reason in Lee Urzua v. Pinochet,6" and finally, in Regina v. Bow
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 3), Lord Millett of the British House of Lords wrote that,
"the limiting factor that prevents the exercise of extra-territorial
criminal jurisdiction from amounting to an unwarranted inter-
ference with the internal affairs of another [S] tate is that, for the
trial to be fully effective, the accused must be present in the fo-
rum [S]tate. "62
While it is true that the foregoing analysis suggests that no
custom has of yet emerged permitting the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in absentia, this hardly amounts to evidence that
there is a custom prohibiting such exercise. The most that can
be said is that States have rarely exercised such jurisdiction. It
must be remembered that State practice is only one of the two
elements that must be present for a customary rule of interna-
tional law to exist. The other is opinionjuris.63 As the PCIJ wrote
in the Lotus case:
Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among
the reported cases were sufficient to prove in point of fact the
circumstances alleged by the Agent for the French Govern-
ment, it would merely show that States had often, in practice
abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that
they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only
if such abstentions were based on their being conscious of having a
duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international cus-
tom.
6 4
The failure of States to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia
is quite possibly attributable to considerations such as political
convenience, public opinion, desire to avoid overburdening
their judicial systems, and the practical challenges associated
with gathering evidence and witnesses in distant States.65 With-
61. See id. at 127, 129 (discussing the Danish case against Pinochet).
62. Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Others
Ex Parte Pinochet, 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L. 1999).
63. A law is "customary" when it can be shown that a State or States have acted
consistently in accordance with it, and the existence of opinio juris, that the State or
States feels bound by it. See generally Julia Edwards, Background of the International Court of
Justice (2004), at http://www.usm.maine.edu/-kuzma/mun/icj/icjpacket.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 14, 2004).
64. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), [1927] P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4
(emphasis added).
65. For a summary of specific instances in which States have declined to prosecute
[Vol. 28:500
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out more extensive evidence, it is impossible to say for sure. It
has arguably not been the product of any conscious belief that
there is a custom prohibiting the exercise of universal jurisdic-
tion in absentia.66
If it is unclear whether custom prohibits the exercise of in
absentia jurisdiction, it is equally unclear whether or not it per-
mits such an exercise. That being said, State practice in recent
years has increasingly supported the view that States may exer-
cise universal jurisdiction in absentia if they so desire. 67 Thus, for
example, Section 8(1) (c) (iii) of the New Zealand International
Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000, states that
"[p]roceedings may be brought for an offence ... whether or
not the person accused was in New Zealand at the time that the
act constituting the offence occurred or at the time a decision
was made to charge the person with an offence. '6  Article 7 of
the Belgian Loi du 16juin 1993 relative d la rpression des violations
for these reasons, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTrY TO
ENACT AND ENFORCE JURISDICTION (2001), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
engior530172001?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
66. As Judge Van den Wyngaert alludes to in her dissenting opinion in the Arrest
Warrant Case, the French Minister explained his opposition to a proposed amendment
to the French Penal Code allowing for universal jurisdiction in absentia:
[emn effet, si Von retenait sa proposition, nombre des victimes vivant en France diposer-
aient plainte, pour la plupart devant le tribunal de grande instance de Paris. Cela
provoquerait un embouteillage considerable qui aboutirait d l'effet inverse de celui
recherchle, car certaines exactions qui pourraient etre sanctionnges ne le seraientjamais
d cause de cet encomrement artificiel. Nous sommes donc dace Id face d un probl~nne
pratique.
[Indeed, if we retained his proposal, many victims living in France would file
complaints, most of them in front of the courts of first instance of Paris. This
would lead to considerable congestion that would produce an effect opposite
of the one intended, because some violation that could have been sanctioned
would not be, due to the artificial congestion. We are thus facing a very practi-
cal problem.]
Counter Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium (Congo v. Belg.), [2001] I.C.J. Plead-
ings, 3.3.63 (citing legislative history in which the French Minister opposes universal
jurisdiction because it will generate too much litigation). See Concerning the Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), [2002] I.C.J. 3, 172 n.121, [2002] 41 I.L.M.
536, 637 n.121 (dissenting opinion of Van den Wyngaert, J.) (alluding to legislative
history from Journal officiel de lAssemblie Nationale [Official Journal of the National As-
sembly], 20 d~cembre 1994, 2e seance, at 9446, cited by Belgium in its Counter Memo-
rial to the Court).
67. See generally Counter Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium (Congo v. Belg.),
[2001] I.C.J. Pleadings.
68. Id. (citing Section 8(1) (c) (iii) of the New Zealand International Crimes and
International Criminal Court Act of 2000).
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graves de droit international humanitaire,69 which provided the basis
for the international arrest warrant which was the subject of the
ICJ decision,70 provided in unambiguous terms for the exercise
of universal jurisdiction in absentia in cases involving certain vio-
lations of international humanitarian law, but was repealed in
August 200371 under political pressure. Currently, Belgian law
69. Loi du 16juin 1993 relative d la rpression des infractions graves de droit international
humanitaires aux Conventions Internationales de Geneve du 12 aoalt 1949 et aux Protocoles Iet
II du 8 juin 1977, additionels d ces Conventions [Law of June 16, 1993 Relative to the
Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention of August 1949 and of Addi-
tional Protocols I and II of June 8, 1977], MONITEUR BELGE 17751 (Aug. 5, 1993), at
www.ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/1993.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) ("ses jurisdictions belges
sont comp~tentes pour connaftre des infractions prvues d la presente loi, indgpendamment du lieu
ou celles-ci auront d commises." [the Belgian courts are competent to hear the breaches
foreseen by this law, without regard to the place where the breach occurred.])
70. See Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 9, [2002] 41 I.L.M at 541-42.
71. See Loi du 23 Avril 2003 - loi modifiant la loi du 16juin 1993 relative d la repres-
sion des violations graves du droit international humanitaire et l'article 144ter du Code judiciaire
[Law of April 23, 2003 - modifying law of June 16, 1993 Concerning the Punishment
of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law and Article 144 of the Judicial
Code] (1), art. 5 (2003) (BeIg.) (modifying art. 7. § 1 of the 1993 draft). Article 5
states:
"Sons rserve d'un dessaisissement prononc dans un des cas prtus aux paragraphes
suivants, les juridictions belges sont comprtentes pour connaftre des infractions prvues
d la prisente loi, independamment du lieu oit celles-ci auront 9t commises et me'me si
l'auteur presum ne se trouve pas en Belgique.
L 'action publique ne pourra toutefois etre engagge que sur requisition du procureurftd-
6ral lorsque :
1 l'infraction n'a pas t6 commise sur le territoire du Royaume;
2' l'auteur presumi n 'est pas belge;
3' l'auteur prgsumg ne se trouve pas sur le territoire du Royaume et
4' la victime n'est pas beige ou ne rgside pas en Belgique depuis au moins trois ans.
Saisi d'une plainte en application de l'alinea 2, le procureur fedlral requiert du juge
d'instruction qu'ii instruise cette plainte, sauf si
10 la plainte est manifestement non fondge ou
2' les faits releugs dans la plainte ne correspondent pas d une qualification de la
presente loi; ou
3' une action publique recevable ne pent rdsulter de cette plainte, ou
4' des circonstances concretes de l'affaire, il ressort que, dans l'int'ret d'une bonne ad-
ministration de lajustice et dans le respect des obligations internationales de la Belgique,
cette affaire devrait #tre porte soit devant les juridictions internationales, soit devant la
juridiction du lieu oz2 lesfaits ont t6 commis, soit devant lajuridiction de l'Etat dont
l'auteur est ressortissant ou celle du lieu ozi il peut tre trouv, et pour autant que cette
juridiction est competente, ind6pendante, impartiale et equitable."
[Subject to dismissal in accordance with the facts foreseen in the following
paragraphs, Belgian judges have jurisdiction to hear of the breaches under
that law, no matter the place where these breaches would have occurred or if
the presumed perpetrator is located in Belgium. Public prosecution will how-
ever only be engaged on the requisition of the federal prosecutor when:
10 the breach has not been committed in the territory of the Kingdom;
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only provides for the possibility of exercising universal jurisdic-
tion in absentia where the country is required to prosecute as a
matter of international law (customary or treaty-based) ,72
2' the presumed doer is not Belgian
30 the presumed doer is not in the territory of the Kingdom;
40 the victim is not Belgian or has not lived in Belgium for at least three years.
If dealing with a complaint under paragraph 2, the federal prosecutor must
ask the magistrate to examine the complaint except if:
1 the complaint is evidently unfounded; or
20 the facts described in the complaint are not to qualify under this law; or
3°an admissible public prosecution can not result from the complaint, or
40 specific circumstances in the case, in the interest ofjustice and in respect of
international agreements of Belgium, this case would be brought to the juris-
diction where the facts took place, or in front of the jurisdiction of the State in
which the perpetrator is a national or the place where he could be found, and
in as much as this jurisdiction is competent, independent, impartial and equi-
table.]
Id.
72. Loi contenant le titre preliminaire du code de procedure penal [Criminal Procedure
Code of Belgium], art. 12. (2003) (BeIg.). Article 12 states:
Sauf dans les cas prevus (article 6, 1' , lbis et 2', article 10, 1' , l'bis et 2' et article
12bis), ainsi quci l'article lObis, la poursuite des infractions dont il s'agit dans le pr4
sent chapitre n'aura lieu que si linculpg est trouvi en Belgique.
Art. 12bis. (Hormis les cas visgs aux articles 6 d 11, les juridictions belges sont 6gale-
ment competentes) pour connaftre des infractions commises hors du territoire du
Royaume et visles par une (regle de droit international conventionnelle ou coutumiere)
(ou une regle de droit dbriv de l'Union europdenne) liant la Belgique, lorsque (cette
regle) lui impose, de quelque maniere que ce soit, de soumettre l'affaire d ses autorites
competentes pour l'exercice des poursuites.)
(Les poursuites, en ce compris 1Instruction, ne peuvent ftre engagges qu W la requite du
procureur ftdral qui apprecie les plaintes &ventuelles. I n ' a pas de voie de recours
contre cette decision.
Saisi d'une plainte en application des alinas prgcidents, le procureurfgddral requiert le
juge dinstruction d'instruire cette plainte sauf si:
I' la plainte est manifestement non fonde; ou
2' les faits releves dans la plainte ne correspondent pas d une qualification des infrac-
tions visles au livre II, titre Ibis, du Code penal (ou d toute autre infraction internatio-
nale incriminee par un traite liant la Belgique); ou
3' une action publique recevable ne peut resulter de cette plainte; ou
4" des circonstances concretes de l'affaire, il ressort que, dans 1intr t d'une bonne ad-
ministration de la justice et dans le respect des obligations internationales de la Belgique,
cette affaire devrait itre portee soit devant les juridictions internationales, soit deuant la
juridiction du lieu ot2 lesfaits ont Mte commis, soit devant lajuridiction de l'Etat dont
l'auteur est ressortissant ou celle du lieu oti il peut Etre trouv, et pour autant que cette
juridiction prsente les qualits dind pendance, d'impartialiti et d'equit, tel que cela
peut notamment ressortir des engagements internationaux relevants liant la Belgique et
cet Etat [ .. . "
[Except in cases authorized by law (article 6, 10, sub-1° and 2', article 10, 10,
sub-I0 and 2°and article sub-12), as well as at article sub-10, the proceedings
described in this Chapter will not occur if the accused is not located in
Belgium
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though this would appear to cover an extremely narrow class of
cases.
A new State has taken Belgium's vanguard position, how-
ever, in providing for universal jurisdiction in absentia. In 2002,
Germany enacted its V6lkerstrafgesetzbuch [Code of Crimes against
International Law], of which Article 1 provides, " [t] his Act shall
apply to all criminal offences against international law desig-
nated under this Act, to serious criminal offences designated
therein even when the offence was committed abroad and bears
no relation to Germany."7 3 This last phrase was intended to over-
rule the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court canvassed
previously, which required that there be some link with Ger-
many, such as the presence of the accused at the time proceed-
ings are initiated at a minimum. 4
Finally, it should be noted that many countries have
adopted legislation implementing international criminal law
that is entirely silent on the issue; thus, while they do not ex-
pressly allow for the possibility, they have also not ruled it out,
75
leaving their national courts the option of allowing proceedings
in absentia to proceed.
The proceedings, including the search for evidence, can be instigated only at
the request of the federal prosecutor who assesses the complaint. There is no
right of review of that decision.
Article sub-12 (Except for the cases aimed at articles 6 to 11, Belgium courts
are also competent) to hear of the breaches that occurred outside of the terri-
tory of the Kingdom and aimed by (rule of international law conventional or
customary) (or a rule of law derived from the European Union) linked to
Belgium, when (this rule) imposed by any means, to file the suit with Belgium
competent authorities in order to exercise the lawsuit.]
Id.
73. Gesetz zur Einffshrung des Vdlkerstrafgesetzbuches [Act to Introduce the
Code of Crimes Against International Law] v. 26.06.2002 (BGB1. I S. 2254) (emphasis
added). See Gerhard Werle and FtorianJessberger, International Criminal Justice is Coming
Home: The New German Code of Crimes Against International Law, 13 CRIM. L. F. 191, 214
(2002).
74. According to an explanatory memorandum by Reydams, the application of
German criminal law to extraterritorial acts that constitute an offense under the V6lker-
strafgesetzbuch ("VStGB") is "not dependent on the existence of a special domestic con-
nection. Because the Federal Supreme Court has so far given a different interpretation
to VStGB § 6, the unambiguous wording of VStGB § 1 now makes it very clear that
offences under the VStGB, in any event, do not require a special domestic link."
REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 42, at 145.
75. See Counter Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium (Congo v. BeIg.), [2001]
I.CJ. Pleadings, 3.3.57 (Sept. 28, 2001) (discussing Penal Code of Bolivia giving na-
tional courts universal competence); see also REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDIcTION, supra
note 42, at 183-92 (discussing Spanish criminal law).
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With respect to municipal case law, the Dutch Court of Ap-
peal explicitly held in In re Bouterse76 that the exercise of univer-
sal jurisdiction did not require Bouterse's presence in the
Netherlands (although the decision was later overturned). 7
Second, in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,78 the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that an alleged Nazi war criminal could be extra-
dited to Israel, since that Nation, in addition to "any other
[N]ation" was entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction despite
Demjanjuk's presence in the United States. 9 On November 5,
1998, the Criminal Division of the Spanish National Court held
unanimously that Spain has jurisdiction to try the crimes com-
mitted by former Chilean president Augusto Pinochet.8 ° Al-
though some of the alleged victims were Spanish nationals, the
court relied on the principle of universal jurisdiction, rather
than passive personal jurisdiction, in its conclusions, despite the
fact that Pinochet was not present in Spain. 81 Finally, before the
Belgian legislation referred to above was repealed, its Cour de
Cassation, overturning a Court of Appeal decision,82 confirmed
that it permitted the exercise of universal jurisdiction over cer-
tain crimes.83
In summary, there is no consensus on whether international
law currently permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction in ab-
76. In re Bouterse, Hof, Amsterdam, Nov. 20, 2000, Nos. R 97/163/12 Sv and R
97/176/12 Sv, 5.4, available at http://www.universaljurisdiction.info/index/Cases/
Cases/Netherlands - Boutersecase/Case DocSummaries/143713,0 (last visited Nov.
14, 2004) (summarizing Bouterse case).
77. See RLF'DAms, UNVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 42, at 178.
78. 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 583.
80. See In re Pinochet, Audencia Nacional, Auto de la Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia
Nacional confirmando la jurisdiccidn de Espafia para conocer de los crimenes de genocidio y terror-
ismo cometidos durante la dictadura chilena [Spanish National Court, Criminal Divison,
confirming the jurisdiction of Spain to hear the crimes of genocide and terrorism com-
mitted during the Chilean dictatorship], Case 1/98, Nov. 5, 1998, available at http://
www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/audi.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
81. See id.
82. In re Sharon, CA June 26, 2002, at http://ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/fichiers/CMA-
sharon-260602.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2004). In reaching the decision, the Court of
Appeals relied primarily on domestic law. It did, however, make some pronouncements
on the right to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia under international law. See id.
Unfortunately, it did not come to any clear conclusions on this point. In certain parts
of the judgment, it appears to cast doubt upon the existence of such a right, while in
others it appears more sympathetic. See id.
83. H.S.A. v. S.A., CC Feb. 12, 2003 Bull. crim. No. P.02.1139.F, available at http://
www.universaljurisdiction.info/index/101391 (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
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sentia. This is due to ambiguity on the following three points:
(1) whether or not the principles set out in the Lotus case con-
tinue to apply; (2) if they do, whether or not a customary law has
crystallized, or is in the process of crystallizing, that would bar
the exercise of in absentia universal jurisdiction, and if not; (3)
whether or not customary law has emerged, or is in the process
of emerging, that would explicitly permit it.
III. HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALES OF THE
CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Universal jurisdiction in its current incarnation has well-de-
veloped historical roots, so an examination of those roots may be
a useful guide in our understanding of more current develop-
ments in this area. Grotius argued that violations of the rules of
natural law constituted offenses against all societas generis humani,
or universal society of humanity. He argued that all States had
an interest, and even a duty, to punish international crimes.8 4
This view has been articulated in the fourth paragraph of the
preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(1998) which affirms "that the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished
and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking
measures at the national level and by enhancing international
cooperation. Under this conception of "international com-
munity," since all States are interested parties in cases involving
the commission of certain serious crimes, there is no reason to
84. See Huco GROTIUS, 3 DE JuRE BELLI Ac PACIS 504 (1925). Grotius wrote:
Kings, and those who are invested with a Power equal to that of Kings, have a
Right to exact Punishments, not only for Injuries committed against them-
selves or their Subjects, but likewise, for those which do not peculiarly concern
them, but which are, in any Persons whatsoever, grievous Violations of the Law
of Nature or Nations. For the Liberty of consulting the Benefit of human
Society, by Punishments, does now, since Civil Societies, and Courts ofJustice,
have been instituted, reside in those who are possessed of the supreme Power,
and that properly, not as they have Authority over others, but as they are in
Subjection to none. For... it is so much more honorable, to revenge other
Peoples Injuries rather than their own . . .Kings, beside the Charge of their
particular Dominions, have upon them the care of human Society in general.
Mark S. Zaid, UniversalJurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Will or Should the United
States Ever Prosecute Ware Criminals?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 447, 449-50 (2001) (citing
GROTIUS, supra, at 504).
85. Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, art. 4, U.N. Doc. No. A/
CONF.183/9 (1988).
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insist on any special link between the victim, the offender, and
that State in order for universal jurisdiction to be exercised.8 6
By contrast, two other prominent historical rationales for
universal jurisdiction support the view that it should not be ex-
tended to cases where the accused is not present on the territory
of the forum State. The first view is illustrated by the following
statement by Donnedieu de Vabres:
Njanmoins, ilfut admis pendant tout le moyen dge, dans la doctrine
italienne, et dans le droit qui gouvernait les rapports des villes
lombardes, qu W lgard de certaines catggories de malfaiteurs danger-
eux - [banniti, vagabundi, assassini,] - la simple prsence, sur le
terrioire, du criminel impuni, 9tant une cause de trouble, donnait
vocation d la citg pour connaitre de son crime.87
[It was recognized during the middle ages, however, accord-
ing to the Italian doctrine, and in the law that used to govern
relationships between lombardic cities, that regarding a cer-
tain category of dangerous criminals - [bandits, vagabonds,
assassins,] - just the presence on the territory of an unpun-
ished criminal, was a cause of trouble, sufficient to give a
right to the city to prosecute the crime.]
Jurists of the Middle Ages assumed that certain dangerous
criminals posed a threat to the societies in which they were
found, presumably since they were likely to commit repeat of-
fenses. For this reason, these jurisdictions were entitled to inves-
tigate and prosecute crimes committed by these actors in other
jurisdictions. Therefore, the accused's presence in the jurisdic-
tion and the danger he posed in that jurisdiction justified the
exercise of universal jurisdiction.8"
Judge Guillaume, in his individual opinion in Arrest War-
86. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1987); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TEX. L. REv. 685 (1988).
87. HENRI DONNEDIEU DE VABREs, LES PRINCIPES MODERNES DE DROIT PENAL INTER-
NATIONAL 135, 136 (1928). According to De Vabres, the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion traces its origins to the Justinian Civil Code, which recognized the jurisdiction of
the district where a crime was committed, or where the accused was apprehended. See
id. at 135.
88. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTY OF STATES TO
ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION (2001), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/




rant,9 outlines a second historical justification for a more restric-
tive version of universal jurisdiction. He writes:
The question has, however, always remained open whether
States other than the territorial State have concurrent juris-
diction to prosecute offenders. A wide debate on the subject
began as early as the foundation in Europe of the major mod-
ern States. Some writers, like Covarruvias and Grotius,
pointed out that the presence on the territory of a State of a foreign
criminal peacefully enjoying the fruits of his crimes was intolerable.
They therefore maintained that it should be possible to prose-
cute perpetrators of certain particularly serious crimes not
only in the State on whose territory the crime was committed
but also in the country where they sought refuge.9 0
Thus, the basis for asserting universal jurisdiction lay in the im-
pact of the accused's presence in the prosecuting State. Permit-
ting the perpetrators of heinous crimes to remain in their State
and be rewarded for fleeing States that could otherwise exercise
jurisdiction, could cause public outrage. Alternatively, this
might be perceived as an endorsement of such individuals' con-
duct and have a harmful effect on public morals.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The recognition of universal jurisdiction in absentia would
have three principal consequences. First, the exercise of univer-
sal jurisdiction in general would become more frequent as all
States would become empowered to try serious international
crimes. While this might have the advantage of reducing the im-
89. See Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), [2002]
I.C.J. 3, [2002] 41 I.L.M. 536 (separate opinion of President Guillaume).
90. Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 36, [2002] 41 I.L.M. at 559 (separate opinion of
President Guillaume) (emphasis added). De Vabres makes a similar point: "[ill in-
tervient, f d~faut de tout autre ltat, pour 6viter, dans un int~r& humain, une impunit6
scandaleuse" [he intervenes in the interest of mankind, failing that any other State
would, in order to avoid a scandalous impunity]. H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, supra note
87, at 135 (emphasis added). See REYDAMs, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 42, at
31. Maurice Travers endorsed both views, writing, "[t]he example of an offender
peacefully enjoying the benefits of his misdeed encourages criminality and the possibil-
ity of an offender taking refuge in a State with the certainty that its penal law will not be
applied would attract riffraff to hospitable countries, necessarily impacting their social
order.. . ." REYDAMS, UNIVERSALJURISDmCTION, supra note 42, at 33 (quoting and translat-
ing MAURICE TRAvERs, 1 LE DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL ET SA MISE EN OEUVRE EN
TEMPS DE PAIX ET EN TEMPS DE GUERRE [International Criminal Law and its Implementa-
tion in Times of Peace and in Times of War] 75 (1920)).
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punity currently enjoyed by the perpetrators of heinous crimes,
it would also raise concerns regarding the stability of interna-
tional relations,9 multiple prosecutions,92 disproportionate use
against non-Western nationals,9 3 and the future role of the Inter-
national Criminal Court ("ICC").
Second, the recognition of universal jurisdiction in absentia
would be likely to increase the effectiveness with which interna-
tional crimes are investigated and prosecuted.94 States seeking to
exercise universal jurisdiction would not be required to wait for
the accused to travel to their country before initiating legal pro-
ceedings. It has been argued that this would have important im-
plications regarding the extent to which criminals are able to
avoid justice for extended periods of time, and also facilitate the
gathering of evidence necessary for obtaining convictions.
Third, it is arguable that the recognition of universal juris-
diction in absentia would increase the scope for prosecuting in-
ternational criminals in absentia. While investigations in absentia
are relatively common and uncontroversial in international law,
the same cannot be said of trials in absentia, which raise serious
legal and policy concerns.
A. More Frequent Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction
If States such as Belgium are entitled to initiate proceedings
in the absence of the accused, it makes sense that they will do so
with increasing frequency. Advocates of a broad conception of
universal jurisdiction argue that this will have the advantage of
decreasing the extent to which international criminals enjoy im-
punity. It is clear that in most cases, the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in absentia would not lead to the incarceration or ex-
tradition of defendants, particularly when they remain in their
home States, which will likely refuse extradition.95 However,
91. See Micaela Frulli, The I. C.J. Judgment on the Belgium v. Congo Case (14 February
2002): A Cautious Stand on Immunity from Prosecution for International Crimes, 3 GER. L.J. 3,
9 (2002).
92. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 90 (2001).
93. See M. 0. Chiloundu, Making Customary International Law Through Municipal Ad-
judication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1141 (1999).
94. Cf Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA.J. INT'L L. 267, 268-69 (1994) (noting that the case
against the defendant becomes weaker as time passes).
95. In the absence of a treaty obligation, extradition is subject to the discretion of
20051 519
520 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:500
Bruce Broomhall has argued that the stigma associated with in-
vestigations and prosecutions, even in absentia, will in some mea-
sure punish criminals, and have the effect of deterring those
crimes for which universal jurisdiction exists.9 6
Broomhall has also argued that investigations and prosecu-
tions in absentia will provide relief for victims and their families
even if the proceedings would not necessarily result in the incar-
ceration of the accused.97 Forum States would serve as "truth
commissions," providing a permanent record of crimes such as
torture, war crimes, and genocide. As Richard Goldstone has
stated, in relation to Rule 61 proceedings that reconfirm indict-
ments despite the accused's failure to appear, "[t] here can be no
justification for ignoring the rights of the victims and of their
families. They too have a right to be heard and thereby begin
their own healing process and that of many tens of thousands of
victims who will identify with them. 98
Namoi Roht-Arriaza has suggested that the increasing ability
of foreign countries to assert jurisdiction will have an catalyzing
effect on States where crimes have been committed (and where
the accused often continues to reside), increasing the likelihood
that the accused will actually be brought to trial and punished.99
Following the indictment of Augusto Pinochet and retired Ar-
gentinean Navy Captain Adolpho Scilingo, in the Spanish Na-
tional Court, 280 complaints were brought by individuals against
Pinochet in Chile. 100 In addition, the Chilean Supreme Court
approved stripping Pinochet of his parliamentary immunity. 101
the requested State. See Bruce Broomhall, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Reali-
ties, and Prospects: Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for
Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 399, 415 (2001).
96. See id. at 417.
97. See id.
98. Mark Thieroff & Edward A. Amley, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in
the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23
YALE J. INT'L L. 231, 247 (1998) (quoting Richard Goldstone, former Justice of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa and a Chief Prosecutor of the Rwanda and Yugo-
slavia tribunals).
99. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and
Prospects: The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 311, 316
(2001).
100. See Sheema Kahn, Welcome Ex-Dictators, Torturers and Tyrants: Comparative Ap-
proaches to Handling Ex-Dictators and Past Human Rights Abuses, 37 GONZ. L. Ruv. 167, 188-
89 (2001).
101. See id.
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The Spanish case turned the issue into a topic of national con-
versation, which in turn led to the institution of a dialogue
roundtable on the subject among military leaders, human rights
lawyers, and representatives of civil society. 112 The Spanish ac-
tion also led to a strengthening of the anti-impunity movement
in Argentina,1 °3 that has led to, inter alia, the repeal of legislation
barring the prosecution of Argentinean military officers1" 4 and
the introduction of legislation expanding the reparations of-
fered to survivors of Argentinean concentration camps.
10 5
While there are therefore some clear benefits to the recog-
nition of universal jurisdiction in absentia, increasing the fre-
quency with which this type of jurisdiction is exercised will pose
the risk of undermining the stability of international relations.
The home State of the accused, or where he or she allegedly
committed the crime, is likely to view the assertion of universal
jurisdiction by foreign Nations as an unwarranted intervention
in its internal affairs. This risk is even more acute in States that
allow for the initiation of criminal proceedings by private indi-
viduals (actio popularis) or where the government does not
tightly control prosecutors. In these countries, the institution of
proceedings by prosecutors or private citizens could alienate
States that the government would not normally risk offending
through the exercise of universal jurisdiction.106 This effect
would be exacerbated if future decisions by international tribu-
nals adopt Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal's re-
quirement that prosecutors must act "in full independence, with-
out links or control by the government of that State" 10 7 in order
for universal jurisdiction in absentia to be exercised, as govern-
ments would be unable to stay the prosecutions that threaten the
stability of their international relationships with other States.
102. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 99, at 316-17.
103. See id. at 316.
104. See id. at 312.
105. See id. at 316.
106. However, it should be noted that in many States the prosecutor, who is gener-
ally subject to government control, possesses an executive veto on proceedings insti-
tuted by individuals. See generally Micah S. Myers, Prosecuting Human Rights Violations in
Europe and America: How Legal System Structure Affects Compliance with International Obliga-
tions, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211 (2003).
107. See Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), [2002]
I.C.J. 3, 80, [2002] 41 I.L.M. 536, 575 (joint separate opinion of Higgins, J., Kooijmans,
J. & Buergenthal, J.).
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In addition, States might abuse universal jurisdiction to
prosecute the nationals of enemy States as a means of gaining a
political advantage or impugning their reputation in the interna-
tional community.' In some cases, States might initiate investi-
gations and prosecutions even where the allegations against an
accused are clearly baseless. As a result, the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in absentia is likely to exacerbate tensions between
States currently involved in a conflict.'
Another concern raised by the recognition of universal ju-
risdiction in absentia is that multiple prosecutions of the same
individual would ensue, as the number of States entitled to exer-
cise jurisdiction would substantially increase. While it is true
that the possibility of multiple prosecutions already exists as a
necessary incident to the existence of extra-territorial forms of
jurisdiction such as personal or objective territorial jurisdiction,
the number of prosecutions in the cases of universal jurisdiction
would be virtually unlimited. In practice, many States would not
initiate proceedings, due to the high costs associated with investi-
gating crimes committed in another country." 0 Some States,
however, such as Belgium,"' and more recently Germany," 2
have demonstrated a commitment to exercising universal juris-
diction. Increasing the number of prosecutions and investiga-
tions would inevitably lead to conflicts over access to evidence
and to the accused, and would increase the likelihood of con-
flicting decisions, which would undermine the legitimacy of the
judicial systems in all States that have exercised jurisdiction.
Western Nations have traditionally exercised universal juris-
diction to prosecute non-Western nationals and leaders.'
108. See Madeline H. Morris, Symposium: UniversalJurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and
Prospects: Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv.
337, 355 (2001).
109. For example, on October 23, 2000, the Arab league released a statement indi-
cating its intention to "pursue, in accordance with international law, those responsible
for these brutal practices." Id. at 355-56 (referring to alleged Israeli crimes against Pales-
tinians).
110. See Talitha Gray, To Keep You Is No Gain, to Kill You Is No Loss: Securing Justice
through the International Criminal Court, 20 ARaz. J. INr'L & CoMP. L. 645, 660-62 (2003)
(discussing expenses associated with creating domestic courts capable of trying war
crimes).
111. See supra notes 8-30, 68-71 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICrION, supra note 42, at 152-56 (discuss-
ing Germany's progressive stance toward universal jurisdiction).
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Verhoeven, for example, perceives universal jurisdiction as a
means of imposing Western values on weaker developing Na-
tions. He writes,
La competence universelle ... n'est que l'expression d'un pouvoir, et
non de lajustice, si certains seulement en revendiquent 1'exercise, tout
comprdhensible que soit le besoin d'un "proces" qu 'gprouvent les vic-
times d infractions particulirement odieuses. Plut6t que les intbrets
de la justice et d'une communautg internationale digne de ce nom,
elle pourrait bien ne servir que ceux d'Etats occidentaux enclins d
maintenir dans une dependence, nio-colonialiste aurait-on dit il y a
plusieurs annges, des socigtis auxquelles ils imposent leur conception
de la ddmocratie. Ce qui n'est sans doute pas tres democratique
114
[The universal competence . . . is only the expression of a
power, not justice, if some are only asserting their rights, the
need of a "lawsuit" is clearly understandable for the victims of
particularly heinous crimes. More than serving the interests
of justice or of the international community, the universal
competence could only be useful to the western States, re-
cently called neo-colonialist, and not to the countries on
which they imposed their idea of democracy. This seems
without a doubt not very democratic .... ]
Quite apart from the increased potential for neo-colonialist
practices, however, a more frequent exercise of universal juris-
diction would mean an increase in the inequitable targeting of
nationals of weaker and poorer States. 115 Such individuals have
always been the main targets of proceedings under the exercise
of universal jurisdiction. As Judge Bula-Bula points out in his
individual opinion in Arrest Warrant, complaints have been insti-
tuted before Belgian courts on the basis of universal jurisdiction
against Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivory Coast, Saddam Hussein of
Iraq, Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo, Ariel Sharon of Israel,
and Paul Biya of Cameroon. 16 Developing Nations, on the other
hand, being politically weaker in the international arena, and
highly dependent on Western powers for humanitarian aid, are
not in a position to initiate investigations and prosecutions of
114. Joe Verhoeven, Vers un ordre reressifuniversel? [Toward a Repressive Universal
Order?], 45 ANNUAIRE FRANcWaS DE DROIT INT'L 55, 63 (1999).
115. See Steven Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Post Mortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 888, 894 (2003).
116. See generally Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April (Congo v. Belg.),
[2002] I.C.J. 3, 126, [2002] 41 I.L.M. 536, 597-621 (separate opinion of Bula-Bula, J.).
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European and North American nationals, particularly where
there is no personal or territorial connection with their coun-
tries.
Even if more powerful and wealthy Nations are in a better
position than developing countries to ensure that Western na-
tionals are not insulated from liability, they cannot be expected
to apply principles of international law consistently. Thus, for
example, a request by seven Iraqi families that Belgian authori-
ties investigate former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, U.S.
Vice President Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell and retired U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf for perpe-
trating war crimes during the 1991 Gulf War ended in the abro-
gation of Belgium's expansive universal jurisdiction legislation
altogether. 1 ' The United States threatened to refuse to fund a
new headquarters building for NATO in Belgium and to con-
sider barring its officials from traveling to the country unless the
Belgium agreed to repeal its law." 8
A final concern in relation to expanding universal jurisdic-
tion is that it could undermine the role of the ICC. Article 17 of
the Rome Statute states:
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and arti-
cle 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible
where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investi-
gation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the
State genuinely to prosecute;" 9
Therefore, assuming the existence of universal jurisdiction in ab-
sentia, a bonafide investigation by any State of any of the offences
listed in Article 5 of the Statute (there is arguably universal juris-
diction for all of these crimes) would preclude a hearing by the
ICC. This would effectively render the Court unnecessary, as-
117. See id.
118. See id. at 891.
119. Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, art. 4, U.N. Doc. No. A/
CONF.183/9 (1988).
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suming that countries such as Belgium insist on exercising uni-
versal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted under interna-
tional law. The D.R.C. has suggested that the exercise of univer-
sal jurisdiction may even run contrary to the object and purpose
of the Rome Statute, in contravention of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.12 ° On the other hand, it is
arguable that if the ICC is successful in bringing criminals to
justice, municipal courts and prosecutors will stop exercising
universal jurisdiction altogether, in which case there would be
little point in recognizing the existence of universal jurisdiction
in absentia.
B. Fewer Delays in Initiating Investigations and Prosecutions
In the event that universal jurisdiction in absentia garners
official recognition, countries desiring to exercise such jurisdic-
tion will not be required to wait for the accused to travel to their
territory (a thing he or she is not likely to do if aware that the
State actively exercises universal jurisdiction). Thus, investiga-
tions and prosecutions could be initiated more rapidly. This
would have two main advantages. First, it would bring perpetra-
tors to justice more quickly. Second, it would increase the likeli-
hood of conviction, since it would facilitate the gathering of evi-
dence and testimony. As Thieroff and Amley point out,
There are a variety of ... pragmatic reasons for the speedy
introduction of information that tends to incriminate the ac-
cused. For example, evidence tends to degrade over time.
Witnesses may forget important facts and details about the
actions of the accused or the context in which the alleged
violations took place. They may also die from natural
causes. 121
However, these arguments are subject to challenge. As has been
mentioned already, the initiation of an investigation or prosecu-
tion will not necessarily result in the extradition and incarcera-
tion of the accused at any stage, particularly where the accused's
home State refuses to cooperate. In addition, with respect to
evidence, since the exercise of universal jurisdiction necessarily
120. See Memorial of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo v. Belg.), [2001]
I.C.J. Pleadings 25; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
121. Thieroff & Amley, supra note 98, at 251.
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means that the crime will have been committed in another State,
there are substantial costs associated with evidence gathering,
such as having witnesses flown in, or having the tribunal visit the
State in which the alleged crimes have taken place in order to
hear testimony. 12 2 In addition, State officials in the jurisdiction
where the evidence lies may be uncooperative, and make it im-
possible to visit crime scenes, or refuse to allow investigators ac-
cess to witnesses. 123 Even when prosecutors can obtain evidence,
it will be difficult for foreign officials to verify its authenticity, or
interpret it properly (particularly where testimony in a foreign
language is concerned). The result is that foreign tribunals and
officials will generally have access to evidence of questionable
authenticity, in smaller quantities, that they may be unable to
properly understand. This would be particularly problematic in
cases of universal jurisdiction in absentia, since not even the ac-
cused would be available to act as a source of information for
prosecution and defense counsel. The result is that the likeli-
hood of obtaining a conviction when universal jurisdiction in ab-
sentia is exercised is less likely than advocates argue.
C. Trials in Absentia
While generally not permitted in common law countries
such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
criminal trials in absentia are accepted practice in civil law coun-
tries. 1 2  States have not as of yet attempted to try international
criminals in absentia in their municipal courts on the basis of uni-
versal jurisdiction. In absentia proceedings, however, have been
used in the context of the International Criminal Tibunal for
the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") to try international criminals
who fail to appear before the tribunal.'25 Although trials are not
held before the tribunal unless the accused is present, under
122. See Luc Reydams, International Decision: Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor, 96 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 231, 233 (2002) (explaining that this is the current practice of States such as
Switzerland when exercising universal jurisdiction).
123. See Broomhall, supra note 95, at 412.
124. See Anne L. Quintal, Rule 61: "The Voice of the Victims"Screams Out ForJustice, 36
COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 723, 741 (1998) (describing in absentia provisions in the crimi-
nal procedure codes of France, Italy, and the Netherlands); see also Neil P. Cohen, Trial
in Absentia Re-Examined, 40 TENN. L. Rxv. 155 (1973) (arguing that many situations war-
rant trials in absentia).
125. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L. L. 516 (2000).
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Rule 61 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure, if the accused fails to
appear, a public hearing is held in which witnesses are called
and evidence is presented in order to determine whether the
indictment against the defendant should be "confirmed," and an
international arrest warrant issued. 126 Rule 61 was adopted in
order to provide a forum for condemning defendants' actions,
and voicing the allegations of their victims. 1 27 Prosecutors in-
voked Rule 61 in the cases of Radko Mladic and Radovan
Karadic, two Bosnian Serbs who failed to appear before the
ICTY.12 8 If universal jurisdiction in absentia gains recognition,
States would be able to conduct Rule 61-type proceedings, or
even conduct trials in absentia of individuals accused of serious
international crimes in municipal courts, particularly civilian ju-
risdictions that allow for such proceedings in their national legis-
lation. It is arguable, however, that this may be an undesirable
development in international law.
Trials and other judicial proceedings in absentia may violate
Article 14(3) (d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, which provides for the right of the accused to be
present during his or her trial.129 Although the United Nations
126. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Forum Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTY), R. 61, U.N.
Doc. IT/321 REV 21 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev
32.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). France suggested that defendants who failed to
appear before the tribunal should be tried in absentia. Due to U.S. opposition to this
suggestion, Rule 61 was proposed as a "compromise" solution. See Letter from the Per-
manent Representative of France to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (Feb.
10, 1993), Annex 2, U.N. Doc. S/25266 (1993); see also Letter from the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General (Apr. 5, 1993), Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25575 (1993). See generally VIRGINIA MORRIS
& MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSIAVIA (1995).
127. See Thieroff & Amley, supra note 98, at 247 (discussing rationales for Rule 61,
including serving as a Truth Commission).
128. See Quintal, supra note 124, at 756.
129. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Assuming a trial
proceeded in absentia and the accused were to become physically available later, there
would exist the practical problem of having to try him again under this covenant, after
the prosecutor already lead all his evidence, much to his disadvantage. Rule 61 ad-
dresses this issue by allowing the prosecutor to lead enough of his evidence to indicate
the kind of case he has against the accused for the benefit of victims and of world
anticipation, but without being required to tip his entire hand. At a Rule 61 hearing in
the case of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, prosecutor Mark Harmon recognized
this compromise, telling the Tribunal:
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Human Rights Committee has expressed the opinion that an ac-
cused who fails to appear waives his or her rights under Article
14(3) (d),°30 this position is disputed by certainjurists. 13 1 As Pro-
fessor Lori Damrosch persuasively argues, the legitimacy of uni-
versal jurisdiction is a function of "the extent to which it is un-
derstood as integrally connected with and supportive of other
equally valid principles of international law."' 132 Such principles
surely include the basic requirement of procedural fairness.
Even assuming the legality of prosecutions in absentia under
international human rights law, however, there are good reasons
for seeking to avoid such proceedings. First, the absence of the
accused in such proceedings may lead juries and officials to draw
the inappropriate inference that because the accused may be ab-
sent he or she is a fugitive and therefore probably guilty, even if
there is not sufficient evidence to support this conclusion.1 33 In
addition, it has been suggested that it is an essential aspect of the
adversarial system that the accused be present to oversee the
work of defense counsel, seeking out improper conduct by the
judge or the jury, or pointing out errors of fact alleged by the
prosecution. 3 It has also been argued that the presence of the
accused during trial is an essential part of the punishment that
the guilty ought to suffer.135 Finally, the legitimacy of proceed-
ings against international criminals will be undermined by trials
It has often been repeated that a Rule 61 hearing is an opportunity to give
voice to the victims. Perhaps. But because this is not a trial, these voices can
be heard only as a plea to the court and the world that [the defendants] be
arrested and brought to justice .. .The remaining evidence will, just like the
already mentioned crime victims, be kept for the moment when Karadzic and
Mladic find themselves as defendants in the dock.
MiRKo KLARIN, INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING ALMOST IN THE DOCK (1996),
available at http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/war/war-44 199608_03.txt (last vis-
ited Nov. 14, 2004).
130. See Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 21st Sess., gen. comt. 13,
art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1994); see also Mbenge v. Zaire, Communication No. 16/
1977, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 38th Sess. at 134, 14.1, U.N. Doc. A/38/40
(1983).
131. See Thieroff & Amley, supra note 98, at 260.
132. See Lori F. Damrosch, Comment: Connecting the Threads in the Fabric of Interna-
tional Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERI-
OUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 91 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
133. See Cohen, supra note 124, at 181.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 179.
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in absentia, as the absence of the accused would convey a mes-
sage that would bring the judicial system of the forum State into
disrepute, i.e., that the State exercising jurisdiction and its judi-
cial system are powerless to bring criminals before their tribu-
nals, or that the defendant does not believe that that he will ob-
tain a fair trial in the State asserting universal jurisdiction. 136
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, it is impossible at this time to say whether or
not universal jurisdiction in absentia is permissible or not as a
matter of international law. This is due to the lack of consensus
on the question whether or not the principles set out in the Lo-
tus case continue to apply. Perhaps more importantly, it is due
to the dearth and inconsistency of State adjudication of this is-
sue. Without more jurisprudence in this area to guide us, it is
difficult to determine whether universal jurisdiction is the pre-
sumptive rule, or where it does exist, the exception.
For the time being, it is sufficient to point out that the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction in absentia is inconsistent with many
of the historical justifications for the exercise of universal juris-
diction. In addition, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in ab-
sentia is likely to pose important problems from a policy point of
view. While the increase in frequency with which such jurisdic-
tion would be exercised would have the effect of decreasing the
impunity perpetrators of serious international crimes currently
enjoy, it is also likely to pose a threat to the stability of interna-
tional relations, lead to multiple claims against individual de-
fendants, and undermine the role played by the ICC. In addi-
tion, while the existence of universal jurisdiction in absentia
would result in fewer delays in bringing defendants to justice,
officials would be required to make decisions on the basis of lit-
tle evidence which might be of questionable authenticity. Fi-
nally, universal jurisdiction in absentia would make it possible for
countries to try international criminals with no connection to
their State. This would call into question the fairness, and by
extension, the legitimacy of such proceedings, and bring into
disrepute the judicial systems that exercise universal jurisdiction.
Guidelines, or restraints upon the exercise of universaljuris-
136. See id. at 177.
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diction in absentia such as those proposed by judges like Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, while creative, do not amount to a
complete response to these concerns. At the very least, they
should be borne in mind by governments as they shape State
practice in the coming years, and by international and municipal
tribunals called upon to rule on the scope of the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction in the future.
